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Abstract: 
Background: 
Many outbreaks of the Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) occurred in 
healthcare settings and involved health care workers (HCWs).  We describe the occurrence of an 
outbreak among HCWs and attempt to characterize at risk exposures to improve future infection 
control interventions.  
Materials and Methods: This study included an index case and all HCWs contacts.   All 
contacts were screened for MERS using PCR.  
Results:  During the study period in 2015, the index case was a 30 year-old Filipino nurse who 
had a history of unprotected exposure to a MERS-CoV positive case on May 15, 2015 and had 
multiple negative tests for MERS.  Weeks later, she was diagnosed with pulmonary tuberculosis 
and MERS-CoV infection.    A total of 73 staff were quarantined for 14 days and nasopharyngeal 
swabs were taken on day 2, 5 and 12 post-exposure.  Of those contacts three (4%) were 
confirmed positive for MERS-CoV.  An additional 18 staff were quarantined and had MERS-
CoV swabs.   A 4
th
 case was confirmed positive on day 12.  Subsequent contact investigations 
revealed a four generation transmission.  Only 7 (4.5%) of the total 153 contacts were positive 
for MERS-CoV. 
Conclusion: The role of HCWs in MERS-CoV transmission is complex and although the 
majority of MERS-CoV infected HCWs are asymptomatic or have a mild disease, fatal 
infections can occur and HCWs can play a major role in propagating healthcare facility 
outbreaks. This investigation highlights the need to continuously review infection control 
guidance relating to the role of HCWs in MERS-CoV transmission in healthcare outbreaks.  
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Especially as it relates to the complex questions on definition of risky exposures, who to test and 
the frequency of MERS-CoV testing, criteria for who to quarantine and for how long, and 
clearance and return to active duty criteria.  
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Introduction: 
Since the emergence of the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in 
September 2012, the largest and most documented outbreaks to date had occurred in healthcare 
settings  [1–6].  As of June 26, 2017,  there were 2029 cases including a total of 704 deaths 
reported to World Health Organization [7].  The recent outbreaks of MERS-CoV infection 
highlight the importance of the emergency departments in being the initial site of the spread of 
this virus [8–12].  In addition, hemodialysis units were also highlighted as the focus of multiple 
documented and undocumented outbreaks in Al-Hasa and Taif, Saudi Arabia (SA) [5,13].  From 
April 2014 to November 2016, a total of 295 confirmed cases were admitted to Prince Mohamed 
Bin Abdulaziz Hospital (PMAH), Ministry of Health, Riyadh, SA.  Of those cases, 98 (33%3) 
were diagnosed at PMAH, whereas the rest were transferred to PMAH from other Riyadh 
hospitals, being the reference corona center for the central region of SA. Here, we describe a 
detailed investigation of an outbreak of MERS-CoV among healthcare workers (HCWs) in a 
MERS-CoV referral hospital with key learning points to be highlighted. 
Methods: 
We describe the transmission pattern and contact tracing of a MERS-CoV infected HCW, 
resulting in an outbreak in PMAH in KSA.   All suspected HCWs were tested for MERS-COV 
using real-time polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) [14].  The target upstream of the MERS-
CoV envelope protein gene (upE) and the open reading frame 1a gene (ORF1a) [14].   
The first case who initiated the outbreak was designated as the index case with all her positive 
contacts designated as primary transmissions.  As described previously, subsequent cases 
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resulting from the first-generation cases were called second-generation transmission, and 
infected HCWs from those were designated as third-generation cases and so on [15]. 
Results: 
The index Case:  The case was confirmed on August 12, 2015 (from the first screening swab) 
and the patient was a 30-year-old Filipino nurse who had a history of unprotected exposure to a 
MERS-CoV positive case on May 15, 2015.  She was not overweight (weight 58 kg). At that 
time and as per hospital protocol, she was quarantined for 14 days [16].  MERS-CoV swab was 
documented on day 2, 5 and 12 to be negative (May 17, 23 & 27).  On June 26, she went on 
vacation to the Philippines. Two weeks after her arrival to the Philippines, she manifested 
symptoms of dry cough and shortness of breath.  She self-medicated herself with amoxicillin 
with no significant improvement.  On August 7, she came back to SA and on August 10, she was 
seen at the employee health clinic for evaluation.  Given her recent arrival from a non-endemic 
country, screening for MERS-CoV was not considered.  On August 11, she was allowed to 
resume work despite being symptomatic with dry cough and shortness of breath. On August 12, 
she was admitted as a suspected TB vs. MERS-CoV infection.  On the following day, MERS-
CoV test was positive (Ct values of EG35 and ORF 34), and she also tested positive for 
tuberculosis [17].  
Contacts of the index case: A comprehensive contact tracing was done with a total of 73 staff 
were quarantined for 14 days and nasopharyngeal swabs were taken on day 2, 5 and 12 post-
exposure.  All quarantined HCWs contacts had daily monitoring for fever and respiratory 
symptom.  Of those contacts three (4%) were asymptomatic and confirmed positive for MERS-
CoV by nasopharyngeal swabs (on first swab).  An additional 18 new HCWs contacts were 
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quarantined and had MERS-CoV swabs as indicated above.   A 4
th
 case was asymptomatic and 
tested negative on day 2 and day 5 but was confirmed positive on day 12.  Thus, an additional 7 
staff were quarantined (the 4
th
 case flat mates).  A 5
th
 staff had fever and sore throat and was 
confirmed positive on first swab and she came into contact with 15 additional staff.  A 6
th
 case 
had cough and sore throat and was confirmed positive on 3
rd
 swab.  This 6
th
 case had 21 
additional contacts.  Of those, one nurse was diagnosed with MERS-CoV (the 7
th
 case).  The 
staff was asymptomatic and was positive on the first swab.  The 7
th
 case had an additional 22 
exposed staff but none of them were positive (figure 1).  Thus, only 7 (4.5%) of the total 153 
contacts were positive for MERS-CoV. 
All confirmed cases were nurses and two of the seven subsequent cases were thought to acquire 
the infection through an exposure within the housing compound.  Detailed questioning on the 
significance of the contact with the positive cases revealed the following. Three (43%) had a 
contact less than 1.5 meters, four (57%) had a contact for less than 10 minutes, 3 (43%) had a 
contact < 1.5 meters, and > 10 minutes and the remaining had a contact > 1.5 meters and < 10 
minutes (table 1).  Only the index case had an abnormal chest x-ray and the laboratory 
evaluations of all positive cases are shown in table 2.  All the positive cases were positive on the 
first swab except for two who were positive on the 2
th
 and 3
rd
 swab.  The mean time to negative 
swab was 4.8 days (range 2-14 days). 
Discussion: 
In this outbreak investigation, we report four generation of transmission of MERS-CoV among 
HCWs.  The transmission dynamics suggests that the transmission occurred within the setting of 
the hospital as well as the in the housing environment. These findings highlight the importance 
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of continued vigilance and detailed systematic screening of exposed HCWs whether they are 
symptomatic or not. Such an activity is very complex and often it is difficult to elucidate the 
exact contact pattern between HCWs due to the extensive social interaction within the hospital 
and housing among different healthcare workers from different units. In addition there are 
difficulties in relying on the HCWs memory of exact contacts and infection control precautions 
taken during that contact. 
The index case was initially identified as a contact of a MERS-CoV patients, she had multiple 
swabs that were negative.  She then went to the Philippine and started to have symptoms.  Later, 
she was diagnosed with both MERS-CoV and pulmonary tuberculosis.  Since, the diagnosis of 
MERS had occurred many weeks after several negative MERS swabs, the exact source of the 
infection could not be determined. In the South Korea MERS-CoV outbreak, five patients with 
MERS-CoV had unclear infection sources [15].  During the outbreak investigation, there were 
four spreaders (transmitting MERS to > 1 individuals) and one possibly was a super-spreader 
(transmitted the virus to four HCWs).  In the South Korea outbreak, super-spreader was 
arbitrarily defined as a transmission of MERS-CoV to > 5 cases [15]. However, the exact 
definition of super-spreader is not well established [18].  The characteristics of the index case of 
an infectious disease outbreak potentially influence the transmission dynamics. These dynamics 
may also depend on the traits of the individuals with whom the index case interacts. 
In this investigation, we found that all HCWs were nursing staff.  In a previous outbreak 
study, none of a neurology unit workers contracted MERS, but 15 medical ICU workers (11.7%) 
and 5 emergency department workers (4.1%) did contract MERS [19].  The seropositivity of HCWs after 
a contact with MERS-CoV patients is variable.  In this study, the PCR positivity rate was 4.5% among the 
exposed staff and no serological testing was conducted.  In a previous study of 1169 HCWs, 15 were 
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positive by PCR and 5 of 737 HCWs were positive by serology testing [20].  In a second study from 
Thailand, none of 38 HCWs tested positive by serology [21].  Using serology, none of 48 contacts 
were positive for MERS-CoV infection [22].  In Korea, 36 (19.9%) of 181 confirmed MERS-
CoV cases were HCWs [23]. 
Although MERS-CoV among HCWs is usually asymptomatic or presents as a mild disease, fatal 
cases had been reported.  Comparing MERS-CoV with SARS, the majority of HCWs with SARS 
had symptomatic infection with an associated high case fatality rate.  In one study, the case 
fatality rate was 7% among MERS infected HCWs vs. 12% in SARS among HCWs [24].  The 
current study showed that most of the MERS-CoV positive HCWs had asymptomatic or mild 
disease  consistent with previous observations [25].  What is surprising in our report was the fact 
that asymptomatic HCWs were able to transmit the virus to other HCWs despite being 
asymptomatic.  This is in sharp contrast to the recent report from South Korea were none of 82 
contacts of asymptomatic patients turned to be positive [26].  Although, the Ct value of the index 
case was high, the index case was able to infect additional four cases.  The relationship between 
Ct value and transmission dynamics was not studied.  However, a lower Ct of 31 for E gene was 
significantly lower than the median of 33 of survivors [27].   
 
Systematic thorough screening for MERS-CoV among contacts is needed for effective infection 
control of outbreaks.  The current guidelines from the Saudi Ministry of Health does not 
advocate routine MERS-CoV testing of asymptomatic contacts and advocate the return to normal 
duty.  However, the guidelines stress the need for testing of all those HCWs involved in high-risk 
unprotected exposure.  High-risk exposure was defined as “contact with confirmed MERS-CoV 
case within 1.5 meters for > 10 minutes”.   And those who are asymptomatic should have only 
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one test [28].   The CDC recommends that asymptomatic HCWs do not get routine MERS-CoV 
testing [29].  During an outbreak investigation, HCWs with no symptoms were allowed to work 
with active monitoring and to be excluded from work if they develop  MERS-like symptoms 
developed [30].  The index case acquired MERS from the community and she had a concomitant 
TB with MERS-CoV.  The co-infection might have contributed to increase infectiveness because 
of coughing and damaged lung tissue. The WHO recommends testing of all contacts in health-
care associated outbreaks regardless of the development of symptoms [31].  In addition, WHO 
recommends that asymptomatic HCWs with positive MERS-CoV by PCR should be isolated.  
Those HCWs can return to work when two consecutive upper respiratory tract samples taken at 
least 24 hours apart are negative on RT-PCR [32].n this study, 43% had a contact < 1.5 meters, 
57% had a contact < 10 minutes, and 43% had a high-risk contact (< 1.5 meters and > 10 minutes 
contact).  [33].  Thus, of those positive only 43% had a high-risk exposure and thus this 
definition alone may not be sufficient to exclude HCWs from testing.  In a study of nine HCWs 
who had a contact within 3–6 feet of a MERS-CoV patient revealed that only one of them was 
positive for MERS-CoV [34]. In another study, all HCWs contacts reported 100 % compliance 
with personal protective equipment and none were positive In a study of 48 HCWs contacts, 
none had serologic evidence of MERS-CoV infection [22].  However, the largest screening of 
MERS-CoV among HCWs showed a positive rate of 1.1% among 1695 HCWs [35].  In the 
SARS era, asymptomatic patients were culture negative for SARS [36].  Thus, it is not clear if 
asymptomatic MERS behave similar to SARS patients. 
In conclusion, all HCWs in contact with confirmed MERS-CoVpatients need to be quarantined 
for 14 days no matter how significant the contact is; if the full compliance with PPE cant be 
assured with certainty. One and two sampling might not be adequate and a third sampling is 
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advisable prior to HCW clearance.  The current detailed investigation identified contacts of 
asymptomatic positive MERS-CoV HCWs who tested positive which highlights the possibility 
of being infectious even if symptoms are lacking, a question which has been debated by 
scientists for years.  
.  
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Figure 1: Graphical Representation of the Evolution of the Outbreak 
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Table 1: Characteristics of Confirmed MERS-CoV cases 
 
NO SEX AGE 
Nationality 
Symptoms 
Days to 
negative 
NUMBER 
OF 
CONTACT  
DISTANCE 
OF 
CONTACT 
(meters) 
DURATION 
(min) department 
LOS 
Index F 30 Filipino cough, SOB 2 79 > 1.5 < 10 ICU 32 
1 F 37 Filipino Asymptomatic 4 5 < 1.5 > 10 ICU 10 
2 F 28 Filipino Asymptomatic 4 7 > 1.5 < 10 ICU 10 
3 F 28 Indian Asymptomatic 4 6 > 1.5 < 10 ICU 12 
4 F 26 
Filipino 
Asymptomatic 2 0 < 1.5 > 10 ICU 
14 
5 F 27 Filipino 
fever, sore 
throat 3 21 > 1.5 < 10 WARD 24 16 
6 F 29 Filipino 
cough, Sore 
throat 14 15 > 1.5 < 10 WARD 12 14 
7 M 30 Jordanian Asymptomatic 6 20 < 1.5 > 10 WARD 24 12 
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Table 2: Laboratory Data of Confirmed MERS-CoV cases 
NO 
WBCS  X 
10^9/L 
Hgb g/L 
PLAT X 
10^9/L 
NEUT # X 
10^9/L 
NEUT %  
CK 100 
U/L 
ALT  13 
U/L 
AST 29 U/L 
Creatinine 
umol/L 
Albumin 
33g/L 
Index 6.8 133 330 4.7 69 NA NA NA 61 NA 
1 8 140 205 5.37 70 131 53 32 63.9 43 
2 10 156 360 NA NA NA 14 
20 
67.1 49 
3 12.2 119 206 NA NA NA 28 21 48.3 34 
4 
9 150 301 6.35 71 
NA 
23 32 50.2 45 
5 17.7 146 166 15.3 86 NA 19 20 68.1 45 
6 13 153 439 8.26 64 NA NA NA NA NA 
7 5.2 159 181 2.89 55 NA 20 21 71.8 44 
 
